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Paul Stockton
One of the best ways to honor  those who 
perished on 9/11  is to rededicate ourselves to 
finding,  and fixing, the gaps in  preparedness 
that  still confront  our nation. Over  the past 
decade,  the Department of Defense (DoD) 
has greatly  improved its ability  to support  the 
federal  departments and agencies that  lead 
US preparedness against  terrorism  and 
natural hazards.  Yet,  significant challenges 
remain in our  ability  to provide such defense 
support  to civil authorities.  Still  greater 
shortfalls are emerging in  a  little-known but 
vital realm  of preparedness:  civil support  to 
defense.  
This essay  begins by  examining two gaps 
in  DoD support to civil  authorities.  The first 
is DoD support  to the Federal Emergency 
M a n a g e m e n t A g e n c y  ( F E M A ) f o r 
catastrophes more severe than  Hurricane 
Katrina.  The second gap is that  of defense 
support  to the civilian  law  enforcement 
departments and agencies that lead the 
prevention of terrorism in the United States.  
I will then flip the familiar  construct  of 
defense support  to civil authorities upside 
down,  and explore the crucial roles that 
civilian  agencies – and the private sector  – 
can  play  to support  the Department  of 
Defense. I will argue that  DoD is increasingly 
dependent  on domestic  infrastructure beyond 
the department’s control, and that this 
infrastructure may  be at growing  risk of 
attack.  I will  also argue that only  through  new 
forms of civil-military  cooperation  can  DoD 
ensure its ability  to execute its core missions, 
at  home and abroad.  I hope that  the shortfalls 
highlighted below  will become part  of the 
research  agenda for  graduate students and 
faculty,  and a  focus for  the community  of 
practice in  homeland defense and security 
that  is one of the greatest  achievements of the 
past decade.  
DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES
Complex Catastrophes
The Department  of Defense is well prepared 
to support  the Department  of Homeland 
Security  (DHS), FEMA  and other federal 
departments and agencies in  responding  to 
“normal disasters”  – that  is,  hurricanes, 
wildfires,  and other  events of typical 
magnitude, that  most often  spur  governors to 
request federal assistance or prompt  the 
federal  government to position  resources in 
anticipation  of need. Of course, there are 
opportunities to improve our preparedness 
for normal disasters.  Thanks to the 
leadership of the state governors, we are 
making  progress across a  broad range of 
issues in  defense support  for disaster 
response, especially  in  strengthening unity  of 
effort  between  state and federal military 
response forces.1
The National  Level Exercise 2011  (NLE 11) 
highlighted the need to strengthen  our 
preparedness for  events worse than normal 
disasters – disasters even more severe than 
Hurricane Katrina.  NLE 11  was based on  a 
scenario that  began  with  a  magnitude 7.7 
earthquake along  the New  Madrid fault.  An 
earthquake of that magnitude occurred in 
1812; a  similar  one could strike at  any  time. 
The destructive effects could be far  greater 
than  two centuries ago, however.  The Mid-
America  Earthquake Center  notes that if such 
an  event  were to take place today, “the 
consequences would be much  more 
significant and damage would be much  more 
severe in  terms of injuries and fatalities, 
structural  damage, and economic and social 
impacts.” 2  Indeed,  the resulting  devastation 
could so exceed the damage in normal 
disasters that these extraordinary  events 
should be classified separately  as “complex 
catastrophes.” 
Complex catastrophes differ from  normal 
disasters in two ways.  First,  the scale of 
destruction  is vastly  greater. Katrina  resulted 
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in  8,800 casualties,  primarily  (though  not 
exclusively)  in  Louisiana  and Mississippi.  An 
earthquake like the one described in  NLE 11 
could inflict  up to ten  times as many 
casualties across eight states and four  multi-
state FEMA  regions. 3  Localities and states 
near  the New  Madrid fault  have made 
r e m a r k a b l e p r o g r e s s i n  i m p r o v i n g 
preparedness for  such  an  event. Nevertheless, 
the magnitude of the destruction and need 
for  life-saving  capabilities would almost 
certainly  prompt governors to ask FEMA  for 
large-scale federal assistance – with  FEMA, 
in  turn, asking  DoD for  unprecedented levels 
of defense support.  Responding to those 
requests in  a timely  manner  could create 
complex challenges for  the department  in 
sourcing  the requested capabil i t ies , 
transporting them, and then  providing for 
their  reception, staging, onward movement, 
and integration  in a  severely  disrupted 
environment.
Second, as NLE 11  demonstrated,  complex 
catastrophes may  create cascading,  region-
wide failures of critical infrastructure, 
start ing with  the disruption  of the 
commercial electric  power  grid.   A  7.7  New 
Madrid earthquake would produce vastly 
greater  damage to the grid than  occurred in 
Hurricane Katrina  or  any  other  disaster  in  US 
history.4 The net  effect of physical damage to 
high-voltage transformers and other  hard-to-
replace components could be lengthy  power 
outages across numerous states, with  the 
potential for  post-quake rolling  blackouts 
also occurring in  Chicago,  the Eastern United 
States, and elsewhere.5
This loss of power could create cascading 
effects on  communications and other critical 
infrastructure. From  a  public safety 
perspective,  the most  immediate concern 
might  be the impact  on  municipal water 
systems, which  in  Memphis and most  other 
cities depend on  commercial  electric power to 
operate.  The loss of power  could jeopardize 
the availability  of drinking  water  from  those 
systems. Transportation  infrastructure could 
be degraded as well; gas and diesel fuel 
pumps,  for  example, depend on electric 
power  to function.  While many  hospitals and 
other facilities critical to disaster  response 
ef forts have backup diesel-powered 
generators, we anticipate few  will have 
sufficient fuel  on  hand to offset  power  outage 
lasting  weeks to months,  and that  companies 
responsible  for resupplying  them  could face a 
radical  mismatch between  supply  and 
demand.  
DoD is working today  with  FEMA  and the 
DHS National Protection  and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD),  as well as other  federal 
departments and agencies, to assess the 
lessons learned from  NLE 11  and better 
prepare for  complex  catastrophes. Doing  so 
will require innovative thinking  on  how  to 
strengthen  our  preparedness. Consensus will 
be easy  to reach on  key  foundations of our 
drive  for  greater  preparedness.  For  example, 
in  both complex  catastrophes and normal 
disasters,  the  Post-Katrina  Emergency 
Reform  Act  of 2006  (and the leadership role 
it  assigns to the administrator of FEMA) will 
continue to govern  response authorities and 
supported/supporting  relationships.  Other 
challenges of preparing  for  complex 
catastrophes could prove more difficult, 
however, starting with  the need for  better 
analysis of how  cascading  infrastructure 
failure could both  increase requests for 
federal  assistance, and make that  assistance 
much more difficult to provide.
Defense Support to Law 
Enforcement   
The most critical shortfalls revealed by  9/11 
were not in  disaster  response, but rather in 
terrorism  prevention.  Over  the past  decade, 
the Department  of Justice (DOJ),  the Federal 
B u r e a u  o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n  ( F B I ) , t h e 
Department of Homeland Security  (DHS), 
and other  federal,  state, local,  and tribal law 
enforcement  agencies have made great 
strides in  strengthening  US prevention 
capabilities.6  The efforts of DoD and its 
partners abroad have also weakened al-
Qaeda.  As President  Obama notes, “we have 
put  al-Qaeda  on the path  to defeat.”  7  The 
president  also notes,  however, that  “we 
continue to face a  significant  terrorist  threat 
from  al-Qaeda, its affiliates,  and its 
adherents.”8  This threat  includes efforts by 
al-Qaeda  to inspire individuals within the 
United States to conduct  their  own  attacks, 
and to disseminate plans on  how  to construct 
improvised explosive devices (IED).9  
Of course, the primary  DoD contribution 
to preventing  terrorism  against  the United 
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States has been  (and will remain) our 
operations abroad to disrupt, dismantle, and 
ultimately  defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates. 
The department also takes very  seriously  its 
responsibilities for  homeland defense, In 
addition,  within  the United States,  DoD 
supports – within  the constraints set  by  the 
Constitution and other  US law  – its lead 
federal  partners in  their  law  enforcement 
efforts when they  request prevention-related 
assistance. Those requests may  grow  in  the 
future.  For  example, if terrorists were to 
launch  a campaign using IED in  the United 
States, DoD has technical  expertise from 
dealing  with  such  threats abroad that – 
consistent  with  US law  – could be used to 
help meet  requests for  assistance by  the FBI, 
DHS and other  law  enforcement agencies 
that would lead domestic  counter-IED 
efforts.   
President  Obama  has taken decisive steps 
to integrate US government prevention 
efforts more effectively.  The June 2011 
National Strategy for Counterterrorism  lays 
out the overarching goals, and the steps to 
achieve them,  that  the US government  will 
follow. 10  Presidential Policy  Directive 8 
(PPD-8), National  Preparedness,  further 
specifies how  the United States will  organize 
to meet the challenges of terrorism  and other 
key  hazards at home.  Among other  features, 
PPD-8  provides for  the creation of a  national 
preparedness system  that will  include a  series 
of integrated national  planning frameworks, 
covering  prevention, protection,  mitigation, 
response, and recovery. The frameworks – 
including prevention  – will be supported by 
an  interagency  operational plan that  provides 
a  detai led concept of operations; a 
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f c r i t i c a l  t a s k s a n d 
responsibilities; detailed resource,  personnel, 
and sourcing  requirements; and specific 
provisions for  the rapid integration  of 
resources and personnel.  PPD-8 also requires 
the DoD and other  federal departments and 
agencies to develop department-level 
operational  plans, as needed, to support  the 
interagency operations plans. 11
 The nation  has long  needed a  national 
prevention framework. Now, thanks to 
PPD-8, we will  soon have one.  PPD-8 sets out 
stringent deadlines for  the development of a 
national preparedness goal and the 
supporting  preparedness system. Building 
out the prevention  framework and the follow-
on  detailed operational plan  will also require 
innovative thinking  and new  approaches to 
strengthen  collaboration,  across the federal 
government  and among  federal,  state,  local, 
tribal, and private sector entities. 12 
CIVIL SUPPORT TO DEFENSE
The concept  of defense support  to civil 
authorities is widely  understood.  Less 
familiar but  increasingly  important  are 
opportunities for  civilian  agencies and private 
sector  support to defense.  Civilian  agency 
support  to DoD was very  much  in  evidence 
on  September  11, 2001.  Firefighters, 
emergency  managers,  and law  enforcement 
personnel from  Arlington, Virginia, and other 
surrounding  communities saved many  lives 
at  the Pentagon. We will always be grateful 
for  their  heroism. Their  support  that  day  also 
foreshadowed a  growing  challenge in  the 
post-9/11  era.   DoD is becoming ever  more 
dependent  on  capabilities provided by 
civilian  agencies and the private sector. Yet, 
those same capabilities are at  increasing  risk 
to cyber  attack and other  threats.  New  forms 
of civil-military  cooperation  are essential to 
meet the novel challenges of this era. 
The Defense Industrial Base
DoD has long depended on  the private sector 
to help arm  and equip the armed services. 
But in  the post-9/11  era, something 
important  has changed: the Defense 
Industrial Base (DIB) is under  cyber  attack 
every  day.  The July  2011  Department of 
Defense Strategy for Operat ing in 
Cyberspace notes 
Foreign cyberspace operations against US 
public and private sector  systems are 
increasing  in number  and sophistication. 
DoD networks are probed millions of times 
every  day, and successful  penetrations have 
led to the loss of thousands of files from  US 
networks and those of US allies and 
industry partners.13 
It is the responsibility  of the Department 
of Homeland Security  to protect  the nation’s 
critical infrastructure, and DIB is one of the 
eighteen  critical infrastructure sectors under 
the National  Infrastructure Protection  Plan. 
Given  the DoD’s particular  dependence on 
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the DIB, the need for  DoD and DHS to 
partner  with  this sector  against  the threats 
they face is especially crucial.  
Accordingly,  the two agencies are now 
working  closely  with  the DIB to increase  the 
protection  of sensitive information.  The DIB 
c o m p r i s e s t h e p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e 
organizations and corporations that  support 
DoD through  the provision of defense 
technologies,  weapons systems, policy  and 
strategy  development, and personnel. To 
increase protection of DIB networks, DoD 
launched the Defense Industrial Base Cyber 
Security  and Information Assurance (CS/IA) 
program  in  2007.  Building  upon this 
program, DOD is working with  DHS to pilot a 
public-private sector relationship intended to 
demonstrate the feasibility  and benefits of 
voluntarily  increasing  the sharing  of 
information  about  malicious or  unauthorized 
cyber  activity  and protective cyber  security 
measures.14
Still to be determined is whether  and how 
the models of the DoD-DHS relationship 
with  the DIB might  be extended to other 
parts of the private sector  on which  DoD 
depends.  The DoD Cyber Strategy lays out 
some key  considerations in  this regard.  The 
S t r a t e g y  n o t e s t h a t  p u b l i c - p r i v a t e 
“partnerships will necessarily  require a 
b a l a n c e b e t w e e n  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d 
volunteerism, and they  will be built  on 
innovation,  openness,  and trust.”  In  some 
cases, incentives or other measures may  be 
necessary  to promote private sector 
participation. Efforts must also extend 
beyond large corporations to small and 
medium-sized businesses to ensure 
participation  and leverage innovation.” 15 
These efforts are only  just  underway, and will 
require intense dialogue and new  thinking on 
the part  of all of those in  this growing  realm 
of collaboration.
 Fortunately,  DHS and DoD have shared 
interests and a  strong  partnership in  this 
area.  Last  year, Secretaries Gates and 
Napolitano signed a memorandum  of 
agreement  laying  out  areas of joint 
cooperation in  cyber  security,  to ensure that 
scarce resources are applied to the highest 
priority  areas and to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of effort. 
Fort Hood and the “Insider Threat” 
DoD has traditionally  focused on  threats 
outside the perimeter  of our  military  bases. 
Our  adversary  now  seeks to exploit  that 
familiar  emphasis, and inspire attacks from 
within. Anwar  al Aulaqi of al-Qaeda  in  the 
Arabian Peninsula  is actively  recruiting  US 
military  personnel and other  radicalized US 
citizens to conduct  “lone actor”  attacks on US 
military  targets.  The author  of Inspire, an 
English  language magazine, intends to 
encourage and facilitate terrorist  attacks on 
the United States.  Al  Aulaqi  has been 
exhorting US sympathizers to conduct attacks 
similar  to that  which  occurred at  Fort  Hood 
in  November  2009: “This is because killing 
10  soldiers in  America  for  example,  is much 
more effective than  killing  100 apostates in 
the Yemeni military.” 16    
DoD is already  taking  a  range of internal 
measures to counter  this new  strategy.  For 
example,  military  facilities in  the United 
States now  benefit from  “active shooter” 
training programs that  will  enable their  force 
protection  personnel to counter  insider 
threats more effectively. The DoD Final 
Recommendations  of the Ft.  Hood Follow-on 
Review  identify  a  score of additional 
measures being  implemented at  military 
facilities nationwide to prevent  a  recurrence 
of the tragedy  that struck Ft.  Hood. 17  Other 
initiatives recommended in  the report, 
however, will  require longer-term  academic 
and policy research. 18 
The need for innovation  is even  greater  in 
those areas where DoD must  depend on 
civilian  departments and agencies to help 
DoD counter  insider threats.  Because DoD is 
generally  restricted from  collecting and 
storing  law  enforcement  information  on US 
citizens,  DoD must rely  on  civilian  agencies 
that  play  an  increasingly  important  role in 
the overall system  that  protects US military 
facilities.  As part of the Ft. Hood review, 
then-Secretary  Gates directed several  actions 
to improve DoD collaboration with  the FBI at 
the Joint  Terrorism  Task Forces.19  These 
ongoing  efforts will be particularly  effective 
in  the context of a  new, consolidated DoD-
FBI Memorandum  of Understanding  being 
developed,  aimed at  promoting systemic, 
s t a n d a r d i z e d i n f o r m a t i o n - s h a r i n g 
mechanisms and clarifying coordination 
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procedures as wel l as invest igat ive 
responsibilities between  DoD and FBI. DoD 
will also rely  on  FBI,  DHS and the other 
civilian  law  enforcement agencies with  which 
the FBI and DHS are networked to provide 
data  on  other domestic  threats to U.S military 
installations,  including  “lone actor”  attackers. 
Further, DoD, as part of its force protection 
efforts, is working  closely  with  state and local 
law  enforcement to recognize the indicators 
of a “lone actor”  threat and share suspicious 
activity  reports to prevent another  Fort Hood 
type of attack from  occurring.  As this novel 
threat  evolves, so too must  the mechanisms 
by  which  the FBI and other  civilian  law 
enforcement agencies will support DoD. 
Mission Assurance 
The cyber  threat to the DIB is only  part  of a 
much  larger  challenge to DoD.  Potential 
adversaries are seeking asymmetric means to 
cripple our force projection,  warfighting, and 
sustainment capabilities,  by  targeting  the 
critical civilian and defense supporting  assets 
(within  the United States and abroad) on 
which  our  forces depend.  This challenge is 
not limited to man-made threats; DoD must 
also execute its mission-essential functions in 
the face of disruptions caused by  naturally 
occurring hazards.20
Threats and hazards to DoD mission 
execution  include incidents such  as 
earthquakes,  naturally  occurring  pandemics, 
solar  weather  events, and industrial 
accidents, as well as kinetic or  virtual attacks 
by  state or  non-state actors. Threats can  also 
emanate from  insiders with  ties to foreign 
c o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , 
homegrown terrorists,  or  individuals with a 
malicious agenda. 
From  a  DoD perspective,  this global 
convergence of unprecedented threats and 
h a z a r d s , a n d v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s a n d 
consequences,  is a  particularly  problematic 
reality  of the post-Cold War  world. 
Successfully  deploying  and sustaining our 
military  forces are increasingly  a  function  of 
interdependent supply  chains and privately 
owned infrastructure within  the United 
States and abroad, including  transportation 
networks,  cyber systems, commercial 
corridors, communications pathways,  and 
energy  grids. This infrastructure largely  falls 
outside DoD direct control.  Adversary  actions 
to destroy, disrupt,  or manipulate  this highly 
vulnerable homeland- and foreign-based 
infrastructure may  be relatively  easy  to 
achieve and extremely  tough to counter. 
Attacking  such “soft,”  diffuse infrastructure 
systems could significantly  affect  our  military 
forces globally  – potentially  blinding  them, 
neutering  their  command and control, 
degrading their  mobility, and isolating them 
from  their  principal sources of logistics 
support. 
The Defense Critical Infrastructure 
Program  (DCIP) under  Mission  Assurance 
seeks to improve execution of DoD assigned 
missions to make them  more resilient. This is 
accomplished through the assessment of the 
supporting  commercial  infrastructure relied 
upon  by  key  nodes during  execution. By 
building  resilience into the system  and 
ensuring  this support  is well maintained, 
DoD aims to ensure it  can  "take a  punch  as 
well  as deliver  one."21  It also provides the 
department the means to priorit ize 
investments across all DoD components and 
assigned missions to the  most critical  issues 
faced by  the department  through  the use of 
risk decision packages (RDP).22
The commercial power  supply  on  which 
DoD depends exemplifies both  the novel 
challenges we face and the great progress we 
are making  with  other  federal  agencies and 
the private sector.  Today’s commercial 
electric power grid has a  great  deal of 
resilience against the sort of disruptive events 
that  have traditionally  been  factored into the 
grid’s design.  Yet,  the grid  will increasingly 
confront threats beyond that  traditional 
design  basis. This complex  risk  environment 
includes:  disruptive or  deliberate attacks, 
either  physical or  cyber  in  nature; severe 
natural hazards such  as geomagnetic  storms 
and natural disasters with  cascading  regional 
and national impacts (as in  NLE 11); long 
supply  chain  lead times for  key  replacement 
electric  power  equipment; transition to 
automated control  systems and other  smart 
grid technologies without  robust  security; 
and more frequent interruptions in  fuel 
supplies to electricity-generating  plants. 
These risks are magnified by  globalization, 
urbanization, and the highly  interconnected 
nature of people,  economies,  information, 
and infrastructure systems.   
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The department  is highly  dependent  on 
commercial power  grids and energy  sources. 
As the largest  consumer  of energy  in  the 
United States,  DoD is dependent  on 
commercial electricity  sources outside its 
o w n e r s h i p a n d c o n t r o l  f o r  s e c u r e , 
uninterrupted power  to support  critical 
missions.  In  fact,  approximately  99  percent of 
the electricity  consumed by  DoD facilities 
originates offsite,  while approximately  85 
percent  of critical electricity  infrastructure 
itself is commercially owned.  
This situation  only  underscores the 
importance of our  partnership with  DHS and 
its work to protect the nation’s critical 
infrastructure – a mission  that serves not 
only  the national  defense but  also the larger 
national purpose of sustaining our  economic 
health and competitiveness.
DoD has traditionally  assumed that the 
commercial  grid  will  be subject  only  to 
infrequent, weather-related,  and short-term 
disruptions,  and that  available backup power 
is sufficient to meet  critical mission  needs. As 
noted in  the February  2008  Report of the 
Defense Science Board Task  Force on DoD 
Energy Strategy,  “In  most  cases,  neither  the 
grid nor  on-base backup power  provides 
sufficient reliability  to ensure continuity  of 
critical  national priority  functions and 
oversight of strategic missions in  the face of a 
long term  (several  months) outage.” 23 
Similarly, a  2009  GAO Report  on  Actions 
Needed to  Improve the Identification and 
Management of Electrical Power Risks  and 
Vulnerabilities  to  DoD Critical Assets  stated 
that DoD mission-critical assets rely 
primarily  on  commercial electric power  and 
are vulnerable to disruptions in  electric 
p o w e r  s u p p l i e s .24  M o r e o v e r , t h e s e 
vulnerabilities may  cascade into other  critical 
infrastructure that  uses the grid – 
communications, water,  transportation,  and 
pipelines – that, in  turn,  is needed for  the 
normal operation  of the grid, as well as its 
quick recovery in emergency situations. 
To remedy  this situation, the Defense 
S c i e n c e B o a r d ( D S B ) T a s k F o r c e 
recommended that DoD take a broad-based 
approach, including  a  focused analysis of 
critical functions and supporting  assets,  a 
more realistic  assessment  of electricity  outage 
cause and duration, and an  integrated 
approach  to risk  management that  includes 
greater  efficiency,  renewable resources, 
distributed generation,  and increased 
reliability. DoD Mission Assurance is 
designed to carry  forward the DSB 
recommendations. 
Yet,  for a  variety  of reasons – technical, 
financial, regulatory, and legal  – DoD has 
limited ability  to manage electrical power 
demand and supply  on  its installations.  As 
noted above, DHS is the lead agency  for 
critical infrastructure protection  by  law  and 
pursuant to Homeland Security  Presidential 
Directive 7. The Department of Energy  (DOE) 
is the lead agency  on  energy  matters.  And 
within  DoD, energy  and energy  security  roles 
and responsibilities are distributed and 
shared,  with  different entities managing 
security  against  physical,  nuclear,  and cyber 
threats; cost  and regulatory  compliance; and 
the response to natural disasters. And of 
course,  production and delivery  of electric 
power  to most DoD installations are 
controlled by  commercial entities that are 
regulated by  state and local  uti l i ty 
commissions. The resulting  paradox: DoD is 
dependent  on  a  commercial  power  system 
over  which it does not  – and never  will  – 
exercise control. 
Although  there are  steps DoD can and 
should take on its own to improve resilience 
and continuity  of operations, achieving  more 
comprehensive electric grid security  to 
ensure critical DoD missions is not 
something  DoD can  do alone. Meeting  and 
securing  the critical  electric power needs of 
DoD in  an  interdependent  and increasingly 
complex risk  environment  requires a  broad 
scope of collaborative engagement between 
government  and industry  stakeholders whose 
roles and responsibilities in  power grid 
security  and resiliency  are distributed and 
shared. 
DoD is collaborating  with  DOE, DHS, the 
Federal  Energy  Regulatory  Commission, and 
industry  representatives, namely  the North 
American  Electric Reliability  Corporation 
(NERC),  in these matters. For  example, DoD 
is planning  to develop a combined kinetic 
and cyber threat-based scenario for  the US 
electric power  grid.  This scenario could be 
tested by  DOE and others on  a regional scale 
throughout the country  and could produce 
data  to support the development of a  new 
system  "design basis" for  building additional 
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resilience in  the US electric power  grid.  The 
department is also working  with  the NERC 
on  a  case study  of a  military  installation for 
analysis,  paired up with  the local utility 
provider,  to determine what  can  be done in 
the short term  to mitigate electric power 
vulnerabilities and risks.  DoD will make the 
results of this analysis more broadly  available 
to DHS, DOE,  and the industry.  These efforts 
will help DoD achieve greater  energy  grid 
security  and resiliency  and help mitigate the 
risks to critical DoD missions from 
commercial power outages.  
DoD is making  organizational  changes and 
capability  improvements that  address electric 
power  reliability  and security  issues and that 
enable better  risk-informed decision-making 
and investments. In  January  2011,  DoD 
submitted a  report to Congress describing 
on-going  efforts to mitigate the risks posed to 
critical DoD missions by  extended power 
outages resulting  from  failure of the 
commercial electricity  supply  or  grid and 
related infrastructure.25  
In  the report, DoD identified risks to the 
infrastructure supporting  its key  missions 
and is working with  affected mission  owners 
to "buy  down" risk to an acceptable level. 
When  fully  implemented, risk  reduction 
courses of action  are aimed at  reducing  these 
risks to an  acceptable level for  DoD. DoD is 
conducting  a series of case studies to identify 
the policy  and technical issues associated 
with mitigating  long-term  electric power 
outages on  installations. DoD is also planning 
a n d c o n d u c t i n g  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s o n 
installations to create cyber-secure power 
systems with microgrids and other  smart  grid 
technologies to improve electric grid security. 
The Marine Corps Air  Ground Combat Center 
at  Twentynine Palms,  Cali fornia,  is 
implementing energy  eff ic iency  and 
alternative energy  initiatives to demonstrate 
how  microgrids will serve as an  important 
component of the smart grid.  
DoD established the Energy  Grid Security 
Executive Council (EGSEC) to oversee many 
of these initiatives.   The EGSEC brings 
together  experts and senior  executives from 
across DoD and from  DOE and DHS to focus 
on  ensuring the security  of the  electric  grid 
that  serves DoD.   The EGSEC focuses on  DoD 
energy  grid vulnerability  issues, the risk to 
critical missions created by  commercial 
p o w e r  o u t a g e s ,  a n d d e v e l o p i n g 
comprehensive mitigating solutions.  
We must identify  and acknowledge our 
vulnerabilities and make the right choices – 
in  collaboration  with our  strategic “partners” 
– to buy  down  our  collective risk to an 
acceptable and affordable  level in  an 
informed way  across the department. 
Determining how  best  to do that will require 
a  sustained analytic effort  and a  willingness 
to collaborate in  new  ways.  Driving  that 
process forward, in  the realm  of mission 
assurance and so many  others, would be a 
wonderful  way  to honor  those who perished 
on 9/11.
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